



In the twentieth century. Plato and Nietzsche are often taken as
representing radically opposed views concerning a cluster of
fundamental philosophical issues. On the one hand. Plato is seen as
urging the metaphysical picture of a stable realm of eternal. self-
identical forms-the realm of being-as standing as the true world
behind the transient sensorily-apparent domain ofbecoming. In contrast,
Nietzsche is taken as the advocate of the reality of this 'becoming'-a
thinker for whom the world of stable forms is nothing but a human
construct imposed on the world. t
From the pOint of view of late twentieth-century 'post-modern'
culture. of the two thinkers Nietzsche undoubtedly looks the more
contemporary. Probably the closest we can come to conceive of
something like the Platonic stance is to consider natural science:
substitute the idea of the fundamental laws of nature for Plato' s realm
of forms. and our modern scientific world view can seem rather
Platonic.2 This. however. is a very significant substitution. For Plato.
the perfection of one's theoretical grasp of the world meant the
simultaneous perfecting ofone' s aesthetic and moral attitudes towards
it. So interlocked are these realms that in the Symposium he could
describe an 'ascent to the forms' in terms of an education of the senses
that was fundamentally aesthetic. Writing between the l860s and the
late 1880s, Nietzsche was well positioned to appreciate the consequences
for aesthetic and moral edification of the growth of science. Through
its role in what Weber was later to call the 'disenchantment' of the
world. science seemed to undermine rather than underpin moral and
aesthetic life. Simultaneous with this process. actual aesthetic life itself
under conditions of modernity seemed to go in the direction of what
Odo Marquard has referred to as a 'no longer fine an'. an art for which
the task of representing the essential beauty of the world was no longer
the main criterion.3
Out Plato's legacy for modern life is more ambiguous than a simple
contrast with Nietzsche would suggest. and this is an ambiguity which
is especially peninent where 'aesthetic' concerns are in focus.4 In this
paper I will examine very briefly the well-known 'ascent' passage in
Plato's Symposium from the point of view of a framework Nietzsche
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develops for the criticism of the type of metaphysical thinking of
which Plato is held as exemplary. Applying aconception of the process
of idealisation worked out in On (lie Genealogy ofMorals to Diotima' s
speech in the Symposium, we see that rather than exemplifying that
type of thought characteristic of metaphysical Platonism, Plato can
also be seen as exemplifying a form of thought which Nietzsche
proposes as an alternative. But to see this. we have to adopt a point of
view which is more typically 'Nietzschean' than 'Platonic'. In the
Genealogy, rather than criticise what Platonism takes as counting as
the real, Nietzsche develops acritique of the processes by which forms
of thought produce their ideas about the real. Thus we find there an
implicit sketch of two processes of idealisation, processes via which a
thinker will pass from aform of intentionality engaged with immediately,
sensuously present phenomena to one more 'ideal'. Using adistinction
drawn from Nietzsche's other writings, we might contrast these two
processes of idealisation as 'active' and 'reactive'. Such a contrast
makes a suggestive contribution to philosophy, I believe, one that is
especially important for thinking about value-theoretic area" like ethics
and aesthetics from the more' naturalistic' point of view of the present.
But ifit allows us to see a more 'Nietzschean' element in Plato, it may
also reveal, to a greater extent than is commonly recognized, a more
Platonic dimension to our paradigmatic post-modem-Nietzsche.
Throughout his work, Nietzsche was concerned with the diagnosis of a
modern pathology-the modern dissociation ofintclligence and sense,
the mind and the body, morality and motivation, a dissociation which
threatened our capacity to value and which was at the heart of the
phenomenon of nihilism. In his early Birth ofTragedy, he traced back
this disease to a type of thought which had emerged within classical
Greek culture and which was responsible for the decline of its highest
cultural product. Attic tragedy. TIlis thought form which he there
referred to as Socratism5 involved an idealisation of the world, a
movement in thought away from the world as directly perceived and
fclt. What was found by abstract thought behind or beyond the
sensuously present, that is, that which was intelligible, was now taken
to be the real. In short, with Socratism or, as he later called it,
Platonism. the abstract understanding had replaced the senses as
providing the criteria of reality.6 In one of Nietzsche's pithy phrases,
Socratism turned life into a soluble puzzle.
In the later On (he Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche sketched
another account of the genesis of the dissociation of feeling and
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thought and the subordination of the former to the latter, this time in the
realm of ethics.7 Here a story was told of an ancient society of slave-
owning nobles, a group of individuals who, loving their own way of
life, affirmed its goodness on no other grounds than that it was theirs.
These nohle masters manifested the same sort of unity of sense
experience and action that Rousseau had attributed to the noble savage
over a century before. In Rousseauean primitivism the pre-social
savage had led an authentic and non-alienated existence: here individuals
were in tune with the states of their bodily selves. Against the backdrop
of such a norm, social life was seen to have induced a reflective grasp
of the self, such that individuals now understood themselves, their
desires and their satisfactions comparatively, that is, in relation to with
what was perceived of the states of others. The result of this wa<; to
disrupt the unity between the self and its felt bodily states. The modern
internally alienated or dissociated individual was born.
But Nietzsche reinterpreted this distinction between natural and
social existence in order to distinguish two forms of sociality. He
distinguished two ways of life involving different ways in which the
self was defined and evaluated in relation to others.8 While the lives
of the ancient masters instanced one way. a form of life originating
in the revolt of their slaves instanced the other. What was crucial was
which term of the relation between self and other was the more basic.
The ancient nobles had primarily affirmed themselves and their
own way of life and as part of this artirmation had condemned the
lives of those who did not live up to such a standard-their slaves.
In terms of the quality of the lives being led. they themselves were
good and their slaves bad, bad precisely because in being slaves their
actions were not grounded in affirmative evaluations, in their own
love of their own forms of behaviour, but directed from elsewhere.
Simply put, slaves did not live their own lives because they were
instruments in the lives of ethers. But after the fateful revolt of the
slaves, an event which seems to have included the development of
both Platonism and Christianity, another way of relating to one's life
and its activities and objects arose. The slaves had had no way of life of
their own to affirm. so they began their revolt by denouncing the lives
of their masters----oenouncing those lives as evil. Such an act was one
of meta-evaluation because it took as its object no specific thing
or action but the first-order evaluations of the masters themselves. Its
rule was: whatever the master deems good is to be condemned as evil.
It was only then that the slaves affirmed their own lives, and they did
this by way of a negating contrast. 'We arc not like that', they said, 'we
96
Paul Redding
are not evil, therefore, we must be "good'" Y
But this new concept of good had to be structurally different to the
old self-referring concept of the masters. The slaves still did not affirm
a specific way of life, rather they deemed as good anything that
avoided the evil of the masters'lives. Thus a form of morality was born
which was uncoupled from any substantial idea of a 'good life'-like
the ten commandments its determinate conceptions essentially added
up to an inventory of forbidden fruits, those evil acts to be avoided if
one were to be good.
What I have been describing is the process that I earlier referred to
as reactive idealisation. But Nietzsche also briefly alludes to another
form of idealisation which he adduces from etymological evidence
surrounding words like good and bad. The nobles' concept of good
was also transformed by a type of metaphorical or analogical extension.
Starting from a basically political concept of the 'noble', the term was
stretched to apply to individuals who manifested certain 'higher'
characteristics:
cverywhere 'noble,' 'arislocratic,' in the social sense, is the basic
concept from which 'good' in tJ1C sense of 'with aristocratic soul,'
'nohle,' 'with asoul of high order,' 'with aprivileged soul' necessarily
developed. 10
A parallel type movement is held to occur with the history of 'bad'.
What is constant in the evolution of this pair is some sense of the
distinction between higher and lower or over and under. This concept
of aboveness or overness had originally referred to a relation of power:
The nobles held power over the slaves. But this idea of aboveness of
the noble was then displaced onto other attributes now valued as being
'higher' than those commonly encountered, resulting in a process of
idealisation. I I This process is like that generated by the slave revolt in
as much as it accompanied the nobles' loss of political power, but
whereas reactive idealisation ended with a negative or reactive concept
of good. here 'after the decline of the nObility, the word [noble] is left
to designate nobility ofsoul'.12
I suggest that these two processes make use of two different logics.
The basic concepts of reacti ve idealisation instantiated in good and evil
are logical complements and because of this onlyoneofthem will have
its own concrete empirical content. But the concepts of active
idealisation are polar opposites and here both terms can typically be
exemplified. Here further categories can he produced which are related
to the original terms. not in terms of logical relations traditionally
conceived. but rather in terms or melaphoricallinkages which preserve
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the sense of what some quality is like and thus, how its bearer can be
like other things in the sense of analogous, rather than as like instances
of single kind. A noble qua member of a political aristocracy and
someone who has a nohle spirit do not belong to the same class of
ohjects, nevertheless we understand easily enough what it means for a
person to have a nohle spirit and grasp that it has some sort of
connection with the idea of a noble, literally meant.
Recent linguistic studies of metaphorical categorisation have started
to fill out what is sketchily but suggestively put forward by Nietzsche
in all the Genealogy ojMorals, 13 hut if we want to see an exemplary
account of the distinctness of active idealisation we should look no
further than Diotima's account oflove and beauty in Plato's Symposium.
The setting ofPlalo's Symposium is adrinking party given to celebrate
the victory at the great Dionysia of the young playwright Agathon and
the 'action' consists essentially in a series of encomia to Eros, the god
and the thing. The love discussed in the speeches of the six symposiasts
(Phaedrus. Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes. Agathon and
Socrates) is predominantly homosexual, a significant fact given not
only the sanctioning in Classical Greece of sexual relations between an
older man and an adolescent boy (the erastes and the eromenos), but
the idealisation of such relations above those heterosexual relations
alongside of which they stood. Homosexual love was regarded as
potentially a more spiritual form oflove than hetcrosexuallove because
il involved an educative dimension, the affair being regarded as a
context within which the young hoy was introduced into the realm of
the male ruling eliIe. It is thus that Pausanias distinguishes vulgar or
ba<;e love from noble love: vulgar love can be both heterosexual or
homosexual and is directed to sexual gratification alone. but noble love
is exclusively homosexual and bound up with the concern to educate
the boy so that he become a full member of the polis. But noble love
can develop from homosexual ha<;e love, and it does so by virtue of
Nietzsche's logic of active idealisation.
It is the most straightforwardly sexual form oferos, the base form it
shares with heterosexual love, which, in Diotima's speech as recounted
by Socrates, forms the starting point for the spiritual ascent from
sexual desire into the type of loving contemplation of the world as a
whole found in philosophy. As with the speeches of the symposiasts,
that of DiotimaiSocrates freely employs personification: neither a god




messcngers who shuttle hack and forth betwecn the two, convcying
praycr and sacrifice from men to gods, whilc to men they bring
commands from the gods and giflS in rctum for sacrifices. Being in the
middle of the two, they round outtlle whole and hind fast the all to all.
Through them all divination passes, through them the art of pricsl<; in
sacrifice and ritual, in enchanunenl, prophecy and sorcery' (202 E-
203 A)
This 'in betweenness' of love will be the major theme of Diotima's
speech and is a central idea for Plato's understanding of beauty. Love
is what is responsihle for the degree of transcendence of hodily-
determined passions possihle in humans and the context fur its
emergence and activity is heauty.
How love of the heautiful in the concrete sense of the sexual desire
for a heautiful body is transformed into the love of wisdom is the
suhject of the famous 'ascent' passage of Diotima's speech. After
examining the nature of love and its ohject, Diotima shifts to the
question of the manner in which a lover pursues what is loved-what
is it that the lover docs 'with the eagerness and zeal we call love'?
(206B) Here the overtly sexual dimension of eros is important. When
Diotima notes that we all arc pregnant' in both hody and in soul' and on
reaching a certain age desire to give hirth, she clearly includes male
sexual activity itself as a type of 'giving birth'. But such 'giving birth'
is not possihle 'in anything ugly; only in something heautiful' (206e).
Beauty is that which incites the actions of love, which result in
procreation:
whcncver pregnant animals or persons draw ncar to heauty; they
hecome gcntle and joyfully disposed and give hirth and reproduce; hut
ncar ugliness they arc foul-faced ,Uld draw hack in pain; they tum away
and shrink hack and do not reproduce (2060)
This rather elastic metaphor of procreative action induced by beauty
will he the matrix for the idealisation of love. The relevant elements of
this schema are those of sexual passion or eros, heauty as that which
attracts eros, and generation or procreation as the outcome of eros. Let
us tirst look at the relation here hetween sexuality and generation.
For Diotima it would seem that the felt desire of eros cannot simply
be thought as aiming at sexual union: rather. in some sense it is the
generation of the species which is what is desired when we experience
sexual desire. This retlects the Greek tendency to take a less suhjective
approach to intentions than we do. Because sexual desire is subjectively
experienced as desire for union, we tend to think of this union as its
goal. But the Greeks conceived this more ohjectively: hecause in the
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natural order of things sexual union was linked with generation, it must
be generation which is the real object of sexual desire. But what is the
desire for generation? For Diotima it is a manifestation of the desire for
immortality. We mortal beings being denied immortality, desire a type
of proxy version-we desire to have the offspring within which
something of us will be carried beyond the grave (207A-D).
Next, the meaning of generation is metaphorically expanded from
meaning the mere biological generation of offspring. The life of the
individual is also a seen as a process in which phases or stages follow
each other in succession as if each new phase is born from out of the
old. and this even applies to the phases of the individual's mental life
(207E-208B). Furthermore, it is extended to the 'giving birth' of words
and deeds. And ifimmortality can be extended to the idea ofbeing kept
alive within the biological existence of one's offspring, it can be
extended to the idea of being kept alive via their own verbal and
conceptual 'offspring'-we desire to be kept alive in the memory and
talk of those who succeed us.
This basic schema of reproduction is rich for metaphorical
elaboration, an elaboration which can apply also to the nature of erotic
desire. Thus there are the two forms that this eros can take: those who
are simply 'pregnant in Ihe hody ... turn to women and pursue love in
that way' (208E). while there are others who are 'pregnant in the soul'.
such as the poets who bear and bring forth wisdom and other virtues, as
well as 'the craftsmen who are said to be creative' (209A). Among the
creative activities of the latter, the highest form is that which gives rise
to well ordered and just states-the creations of legislators.
What is the necessary context within which this type of cultural or
spiritual production takes place? What are the factors and conditions
which promote this form of generation and what are the conditions that
impede it? Here we must remember that eros is always desire for
'generation in the beautiful'. and it is here that Plato brings in the
culturally sanctioned relation of the erastes and the eromenos.
When someone has hccn prcgnant with these in his soul from early
youth, while he is still a virgin, and, having arrived at the proper age,
desires to beget and give hirth, he too will certainly go about seeking
the beauty in which he would heget: for he will never beget in anylhing
ugly. Since he is pregnalll, then, he is much more drawn to bodies that
are beautiful than to those that arc ugly; and if he also has the luck to
find a soul that is hcauliful and nohlc and well-formed, he is even more
drawn to this comhinalion: such a man makes him instantly teem with
ideas and arguments (or speech or ideas-logo i) about virtue-Ihe
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qualities a virtuous man should have and the customary activities in
which he should engage; and so he tries to educate him.... And in
common with him he nurtures the newborn; such people, therefore,
have much more to share than do the parent" of human children, and
have a fmner bond of friendship, because the children in whom 111ey
have a share are more beautiful and more immortal. Everybody would
rather have such children than human ones, and would look up 10
Homer, Hesiod and 111e olher good poclS with envy and admiralion for
the offspring they have len behind-offspring, which, lxx:ausc they
are immortal 111emselves, provide their parenls with immOrla] glory
and rememhrance (20~H3-D)
This, then, is the conceptual and figurative framework within
which 'ascent' from the first and most immediate manifestation of eros
to its most complete and essential statc-Ioving intellectual union with
the forms-takes place. Eros Slarts with the vulgar anraction to the
beautiful body, and as such is cenlred on those base desires of the
erastes, for whom the boy is as yet only the promise of gratified desire.
But even here, among the acts to which the lover is inspired will be the
giving birth of beautiful words and ideas (logoi) directed at the boy,
and this form of generation has an imponant transformative effect on
the erastes himself. Such acts in which the desired object becomes
bathed in words lifts it, as it were, from out of its brute sensuously-
perceived particularity. and it docs this because of the very gcnerality
of the words themselves. The boy's body now becomes an instance or
exemplar of something greater than itself, a beauty which can now
include the boy's soul. The soul, of course, displacing the body, will
become the new 'object' of love, but the soul only becomes disclosed
to the lover beclluse o/his original ardour for the body. This has all
occurred only because the ernstes had come to grasp his loved one as
held within the magical web of logoi that he himself had spun-
initially there had been the mere brute fact of the erastes arousal by the
boy, but the logoi induced then allowed the ernstes to understand his
arousal as a type of appreciative registering or acknowledgment of an
abstract quality, the beauty instantiated or exemplified in the boy. Thus
although a lover must havc staned by 'devot[ing] himself to beautiful
bodies', by vinue of his subsequent allered orientation to the world. he
will come to realise
that the beauly ofanyone hody is hrother to the beauty of any other and
that if he is to pursue hcauly of fonn he'd he very foolish not 10 Ihink
that the beauty of all hodies is one and the same. When he gmsps 111is,
he must become a lover of all heautiful bodies, and he must think thai
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his wild gaping aftcr just one body is a smaIl thing and despise it.
After this he must think that the beauty of peoplc's souls is more
valuahle than the beauty of their bodies (2 lOA-B)
With this the lover now becomes more capable ofpcrceiving beauty in
more and more abstract, and therefore intelligible, rather than sensuous
things-laws and institutions, the sciences and so on, thus:
TIle result is that he will sce the beauty of knowledge and hc looking
mainly not at heauty in a single cxample-as a servant would who
favoured the heauty ofa little boyar aman or asingle custom-hut the
lover is tumed to the great sea of beauty, and gazing upon this, he givcs
hirth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love
of wisdom, until, having grown and heen strengthencd therc, he
catches sight of such knowledge, and it is the knowledgc of such
heauty (21 OC-E)
In his descriptions of the ultimate end of the process of idealisation,
the entirely intellectual grasp of an eternal realm of forms, Plato is true
to his reputation as a 'Platonist'. While in Nietzsche's more naturalistic
account of idealisation, ideals are generated from the life-process
itself, in Diotima's account, Eros is ultimately drawn towards something
already existing, the eternally existing forms of Plato's metaphysics,
which seem incompatible with the modern naturalistic world-view.
But when we focus on Diotima's treatment of the mode of Eros's
movement, she is clearly describing what we have characterised, after
Nietzsche, as active rather than reacti ve idealisation. Diotima does not
see each step in the ascent as emerging out of the imposition of a
negating meta-judgment. A lover does not have his ardour transferred
to 'higher' things because he is somehow converted to a view of the
sensuous body as ugly or hateful. Rather, the lover only comes to
'despise and deem a small thing', the single thing as object of his
violent genital love, the boy as simply beautiful body, after his love has
been transferred to its new object, here the boy as bearer of a beautiful
soul. That is, the possibility of the new 'higher' object appearing for
the desiring subject has been secured by desire having been attached to
the quality of an attracting 'lower' beauty.
Only once the concept ofbeauty has been extended in a metaphorical
way to the soul from the body can the subject then renectively compare
the two sources of attraction and reassess the first, such that it may
now seem 'a small thing'. But the position from which a comparison
could be made could not have been attained had not the attraction to the
body been real and compelling. We might imagine what a 'reactive'
equivalent would be like. The sexual attraction experienced initially
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would undergo some condemnation-'that is not love, it is simply
lust; whatever true love is, it certainly is not like that! '15
Plato's dialectic reappears in a more modern and Kantian form in the
late eighteenth century in Friedrich Schiller's Leiters 011 the Aesthetic
Educatioll oj Man, where his concept of the 'play-drive' plays the
role of Ihe mediating 'in between', allowing desires to transform
themselves in a process of active, aesthetically directed idealisation.
Like eros, (he play drive also starts from a hase form:
The aestllctic play-drivc ... will in its first attempts t>e scarcely
recognizaolc, sincc the physical play-drive, with iL<; wilful moods and
its unruly appetites, constantly gelS in the way. Hence we see
uncullivaled laste firsl seizing upon what is new and startling-on the
colourful, fantastic, and bizarre, the violent and the savage-and
shunning nothing so much a<; tranquil simplicity. It fashions grotesque
shapes, loves swift transitions, exuhenmt fonn, glaring contraSL<;,
garish lights, and a song full of feeling. At this stage what man calls
oeautiful is only what excites him, what offers him material-but
exciles him to a resistance involving autonomous activity, but offers
him material for possiole shaping. Olherwise it would not oe hcauty-
even for him. The ronn of his judgments h:l<; thus undergone an
:l<;tonishing change: he seeks these oojecL<;, nol oecause they give him
sometlling to enjoy passively, out occause they provide an incenlive to
respond activcly.t6
In Schillerian aesthetic education as with its Diotiman precursor, the
idealisation of desire does not proceed from the negation or repression
of its vulgar precursor but rather from a growlh from it, a growth
allowed hy the active response which has heen elicited by the lowly,
and which in turn allows a re-evaluation of its initial stimulus. The
process Schiller descrihes is one in which. say, the love of Bach does
not emerge from a hatred of the Beach Boys. Ralher. the love of Bach
is that very love which earlier had been auached 10 the Beach Boys,
and the heauty of Bach had heen disclosed to music lovers only in
virtue of their own active love for and response to some earlier, cruder
exemplar of musical beauty.
With his invocation of 'drives', Schiller was sounding a note
characteristic of the distinctively modern mode of comprehension
-natural science. In the nineteenth century, Darwin's theory of
evolution would propose a naturalistic way of understanding human
ideals by grounding them in nature in a way that typically is taken as
threatening their normativity. Feeling this threat acutely, Nietzsche
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embraced the nihilistic consequences of naturalism, not to celehrate
the loss of value, but to anempt some sort of reconfiguration of our
understanding and adherence to it, a reconfiguration appropriate to the
conditions of modernity. But his method seems to come straight from
Diotima, once he has persuaded her to abandon the metaphysical
framework of her author, Plato.
In the view of Nietzsche's Diotima, the ideal of beauty might itself
be seen to evolve under the pressure of a type of 'selection', but one in
which the intentional response of the beholder of the beautiful plays an
active role. We might, in Darwinian spirit, describe the first paradigm
of beauty in the Symposium, the beautiful body of the boy, as the
imposed product of sexual drives determined by natural selection. t7
But human intentions necessarily generalise, perhaps simply by dint
of their tendency to be expressed in the generalities of language, and
the body thereby becomes an instance, although an exemplary or
paradigmatic one, of someUling more general-beauty itself. Placed
in the world, the desired body illuminates other aspects of the world
which might then be seen as having an analogous quality. But as these
new examples ofheauty are appreciated and responded to, the paradigm
of the heautiful itself becomes free to shift. What was once a model of
beauty can be pushed aside by something new, that which was the
exemplar now becomes a peripheral and 'small thing', a mere drop in
the sea of beauty.
At first, such apicture seems compatible with anaturalistic outlook.
For example, empirical studies of the nature ofhuman conceptualisation
have shown that the common categories in terms of which we judge the
external world indeed have central and peripheral members: sparrows
but not emus can be 'prototypes' of birds. And there is no reason to
think that what could count as a prototype for some empirical category
should be fixed. Thus according to the Darwin-inspired neuroscientist
Gerald Edelman, the brain is able to reconfigure continually the
perceptual categories encoded in it. IS This means that although the
evaluative dimension ofhuman experience is grounded in the limbic or
'hedonic' system, that ancient part of the brain concerned with appetite
and sexual and consummatory behaviour, our evaluative responses to
the world need in no way be seen as fixed by such a grounding.
Thus stripped of its telos in a metaphysical fantasy, Plato's view
seems to offer a remarkably modern way of conceiving of the develop-
mental continuity of an individual's evaluative experience of the
world, with its biologically given constitution, while nevertheless not
reducing the former to the latter, and it does this hy offering a sketch
104
Paul Redding
of a process through which these initially somatic desires are meta-
morphosed or transfigured into something more 'ideal' via language. t9
Our experience and affective response to the world may be initially
structured by factors given to us from our biology. but once they are
put into words in a process which allows for the creative and figurative
transformation and extension, it becomes open to further reinterpretation
and recategorisation. Vulgar eros is here agood. in as much ali it directs
us to the world and engages us with others. but once engaged we may
on reflection realise that other forms of eros are possible and even
better. And as the forms of our involvements in and talk about the
world become more diverse, and as such involvements and talk disclose
further aspects of the world to be appreciated and valued. we pass from
the rather uniform and repetitive realm of sex to such highly diverse
realms of engagement and experience as those of love and aesthetics.
It might ofcourse be objected that without both the idea ofa fe/os to
this process and the idea of some complete overlapping of the ideals
of truth, beauty and goodness occupying this telos. the Nietzschean
picture can only result in a nihilistic collapse of the objectivity of
value. leaving us with the experience ofour moral, aesthetic, epistemic
lives as being without justification. But it is here, I believe, that the
aesthetic medium of this process is crucial.
One of the founders of modern aesthetics, Immanuel Kant, pointed
to the peculiarity ofaesthetic experience in that its normativity functions
for us without our having any conscious access to its norms: we judge
some singular thing to be beautiful without being able to give the 'rule'
which would justify that judgment. In this way aesthetic experience
becomes a vehicle for the presentation of norms which cannot be
presented in alternative modes. especially in more 'cognitive' modes
of experience. But as we learn from Diotima, the experience of beauty
provokes a reaction, a need to acknowledge and name it. We might
see Plato's own metaphysical images, such as that of the lover turning
towards the sea of beauty. as itself a response to acenain type of world
experience, a form of verbal appreciation or acknowledgment of the
normative role played by the world itsclfwithin our aesthetic. epistemic
and moral lives. So understood. it would be judged in terms of the
degree to which it conveyed a sense of that experienced normativity.
Understood metaphysically. however, Plato's images arc thought
of ali being meant to capture cognitivcly those normative essences
which explain and justify our practices-in the case of beauty, to
capture cognitively what it is about some particular beautiful thing that
makes it beautiful. But this is precisely what Kant denied we could
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know; and it was precisely an analogous denial that Nietzsche extended
to the realms of truth and goodness. That is. in Nietzsche's aestheticised
metaphysics, neither arc there any extra-experiential, cognitively-
graspable principles that we can appeal to as grounds for our epistemic
and practical judgments. Thus it is meaningless to search for what it is
about ethical action that makes it ethical (that is, some entirely cognitive
principle or ground; for example, that the action conforms to the
categorical imperative) or what it is about knowledge that makes it
knowledge (again, some cognitively graspable criterion; for example.
that a belief 'corresponds' to the 'the facts').
Against the expectations generated from Platonist metaphysics,
Nietzsche's aestheticisation ofother realms of value are often understood
as sanctioning a denial of objectivity, and a relativistic attitude of
'anything goes'. Nietzsche saw it the other way around, we fecI the
normativity of the beautiful. we fecI the demand to acknowledge it
when we are in its presence despite the fact that we cannot
simultaneously cognise the ground of this demand. And if we can
experience the compulsion of beaut y. we can experience the compulsion
of truth and goodness as well. With his metaphysics Plato might have
presented us with the problem, hut with Diotima's speech on Eros and
beauty. he presented us with the solution as well.
Notes
Other oppositions flow from this: thus, for example, if what is real is the
stable realm of being, then knowledge will be conceived as a process of
discovery and will aim at some ultimately definitive account; but if being
is really a human construct imposed on a flux of becoming, knowledge
will be understood as creal ion and, like other realms of human creatively,
admit of plurality.
2 And of course, even this residuum of Platonism is denied by many post-
modem thinkers.
3 ado Marquard, 'On the importance of the theory of the unconscious for a
theory of no longer line art'. in New Perspectives in GemUin Literary
Criticism, ed. Richard E. Amacher and Victor Lange, trans. David Henry
Wilson et at., Princeton, N. J.• 1979, and Gyorgy Markus, 'Hegel and the
End of Art', Literature and Aesthetics 6 (1996): 7-26.
4 'Scare quotes' because aesthetics is, in the modem sense of a neatly
demarcated autonomous domain, unUlinkabIc for Plato.
S In The Birth o/Tragedy, Nietzsche told the story of a fall from a golden age
of pagan aestheticism in a way different but nevertheless related to his
later genealogy. Socratism, a type of hyper-rationalistic orientation 10 life
for which Ule character of Socrates was the leading example, was Ulere
10(,
Paul Redding
discussed as emerging within the artistic tradition of Attic tragedy only to
kill it off. The murderer here was the Socratic dramatist Euripides.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth ofTragedy, in Basic Writings ofNietzsche,
ed. Walter Kaufmann, New York, 1968.
6 Indeed, it is ea<;y to see the poetics of Aristotle, himself an enthusiast of
Euripides, as a codification of such a 'Socratic' approach. For Aristotle,
the poetic structure of tragedy is conceived in terms of plot structure
and the well-formedness of plot hangs entirely upon the intelligibility
of the action it represents. This was linked to Aristotle's support for the
secularisation tllat tragedy had achieved with Euripides. Tragedy must
eschew divine influence on events such as the actions of cosmic justice or
fate. Rather, what was responsible for apparent turns of fate were factors
pertaining to the ethical competence of the characters, importantly, those
characteristic flaws within an agent's ethical fabric that Aristotle referred
to with the term hamartia.
7 Nietzsche's account scandalised hecause of its overtly anti-Christian
flavour, but such anti-Christi,m sentimem was probably only a making
explicit of what had been implicit in earlier forms of a line of thought
which ha<; heen tenned pagan aesthelicism. At least since that crossing of
pantheism and Hellenism found in the late eighteenth century, a picture
of a pre-Christian fonn of human cxistence in which value was celebraled
as immanent within nature rather tlwn projected beyond it was hcld up
against the other-worldly aspecls of Christianity.
8 Nietzsche's approach here mighl he thought as belonging to that tradition
of 'pagan aestheticism' which had heen an essential part of the Hellenist
revival of the eighteenth century, hut Nietzsche seemed to give this
tnldition a new twist. See Josef Chytry, The Aesthetic State: A Quest in
Modern GerTlUln Thought, Bcrkeley, 1989.
9 For Nietzsche, the deed and creation of the rebelling slave is to conceive
• "the evil enemy", "the Evil One", and this in fact is his basic
concept, from which he thcn evolves. a<; an afterthought and pendant, a
"good one"-himself!'. 'On lhe Genealogy of Morals' in Basic Writings
of Nietzsche, p.475. I have explorcd the logical structure and the
consequences oftlle slave' s mela-evaluation in more depth in 'Nietzschean
Perspectivism mid the Logic of Practical Reason', Philosophical Forum
22 (1990): 72-88.
10 The opposing terms for 'had' similarly had developed from the tenns
used by such groups of ma<;tcrs to designate the social underc\a<;s. Thus the
developmem of the word for good 'always runs parallel with that other in
which "common", "plebeian", "low" arc finally transformed into the
concept "bad"', Nietzsche. 'On the Genealogy of Morals', pp.46~-4.
II Nietzsche gives the concrete example of the ancient Greek term esthlos.
This term had at one stage signified 'one who is, who possesses reality,
who is actual, who is true', tllat is, true in the sense of a true or full human
heing. But during the decline of the nohility, the term underwent a
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'subjective turn' and now came 10 dcsignate thc nobility in tenns of
somctJli ng tJlcy 'had' ratJlcr than something thcy 'were' . It became regardcd
as one of their essential qualities or habits-truthfulness.
Thus the Greek nobility started to refer to thcmsclves as 'the truthful',
contra';ting themselvcs to the lying conunoncrs. Wc might think of this
change ali resulting from the fact that the nobility had lost sufficient power
to force them to st.art answering the question posed: 'What makes you
more fully human than me?'; see Nictzschc, 'On the Genealogy of
Morals', pp.465-68.
12 'On tJlC Gencalogy of Morals'. pp.465-6.
13 [-'or cxamplc, Gcorge Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By,
Chicago, 1980, ruld Gcorge Lakoff, Women. Fire. and Dangerous Things:
What Categories Reveal aboltlthe Mind. Chicago. 1987.
14 Plato. Symposium. trans. witJl Introduction and Notcs by Alexander
Nchemas and Paul WooorulT, Indianapolis, 1989.
15 As in Nietzschc's suggcstions about tJ1C naturc of active idealisation, the
mctaphorical link between t1le concepts of love and beauty involved
hcrc allow somctJling of tJle prescrvation of the experience of qualities.
Pla:o's melaphors testify tJJat for him tJlcrc is, in what it is like to he
attracted to a bcautiful soul, somc conlinuity WitJl allraction to the booy.
The beauty of tJle soul strikcs tJlC lovcr in tJle way that he can bc struck hy
physical heauly: it C:U1 arouse rul :mIcnl activily. thc hegetting of words
and deeds. by means of which tJle lovcr connccls witJl his beloved.
16 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. E. M.
Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughhy. Oxford. 1967. ICllcr 27, 4.
17 Of coursc 10 he effective in the evolutionary terms sexual orivcs must
promotc hctcrosexual hehaviour. OUI it is clear thallhe dcsirahlc eromenos
ha<; a distincl1y fcminiscd quality and tJlal tJlC erastes is attracted to a
membcr of thc srunc sex in only a limited scnse. The appearancc of
masculinised traits in (he boy. the firs! signs of tJ1C beard, for cxample,
marked the point at which the love Wel<; mcant to be 'clcvatcd' to thc
more Platonic variety.
18 Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air. Brilliant Fire: On the Matter ofrlze Mind,
New York, 1992.
19 It is not unusual for Plato's account of love to he compared in this way
to that of Frcud. Sec. for example, Gerasimos Santos, Plato and Freud:
Two Theories ofLove, Oxford. 1988.
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